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THE UNITY OF THE PAIOL EVIDENC.
By JOHN S. STRAIIORN, JR.*

V

RUIA

once remarked that the Holy Roman Empire was
neither holy, Roman, nor an empire. Dean Wigmore has
achieved a similar destruction of the parol evidence rule by hi
statement' that it deals not merely with things parol, is not a
rule of evidence, and is not a single rule. Professor Williston,
in treating of the topic. accepts these conclusions, save the one
denying the unity of the rule.' It would seem from this disagreement that there exists a mooted problem as to the unity of
the parol evidence rule. That there is such a difference of opinion
makes the matter savor strangely of theological quiblings over the
doctrine of the Trinity.
The present discussion proceeds u)on the following premise:
There exists a body of legal doctrine which determines the
extent to which other facts shall have operative effect to establish
the existence and terms of a transaction when the content of a
writing has been offered for the same purpose. This body of
doctrine attaches operative effect to these other facts in some
instances and refuses it in others. Certain writers have generalized this body of doctrine into a single rule, called the parol
evidence rule, thereby attempting to express the extent to which
such body of doctrine denies operative effect to facts dlehors a
writing. Dean \Vigmore has denied the capacity of this body
of doctrine for a single generalization in strong language: "There
is no one generalization for that rule-at least none which has
3
any practical consequence.'
It is the thesis of this discussion that there is a parol evidence
rule, that this body of doctrine can be expressed as a unity, and
that it can be better comprehended by such treatment. Any
generalization which will accomplish the purpose of summarizing
OLTAIRE

*Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of La%%.
Fayetteville, Arkansas.
tResearch Paper No. 150, Journal Series, University of Arkansas.
15 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 2400. The other two points tihere
made are (4) that the parol evidence rule is not all the rules that concern
either parol or writing, and (5) that it does not involve the assumption that
a writing can possess, independently of the surrounding circumstances, an'.
inherent status or efficacy.

22 Williston, Contracts, sec. 632.
'5 Wiginore, Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 2400.
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accurately this body of doctrine must aptly express the circum-

stances under which the rule denies consideration to extrinsic
facts and it must reasonably imply the factors which permit such
facts to be operative. It is the present writer's opinion that such
a generalization exists and that it can be made to harmonize with
and aptly express a valid analysis of the body of doctrine involved.
Using the world "rule" as meaning a possible summation of
this body of doctrine, the instant discussion of the unity problem
will proceed as follows: First, a treatment of the three phases
of the rule which form the foundation for any possible unitary
statement, namely, the effect, the policy, and the scope thereof.
with a discussion of the form of words which best seems to
epitomize each. Then there will be an arrangement of this terminology as a unit, with a discussion of the result, followed by
certain general considerations and a summary. This treatment
of the problem at stake will entail a discussion of much old matter,'
distinguished at most by a slightly different arrangement of familiar details. This is necessary to furnish a background for a discussion of the rule's unity.
I
EFFECT OF THE RULE

The theoretical effect of the rule on the conduct of litigation
is to deprive certain facts extrinsic to the writing of the operative
effect they would have but for the presence of the written fact
covering the same subject matter. The practical effect of the
rule is to debar certain evidence from consideration in a case
where its purpose is to establish a fact declared irrelevant by
the rule. When the extrinsic evidence has no other purpose
than to establish a forbidden fact. it is debarred. \When it has
another valid purpose, it may be admitted for that purpose alone.
The phrasing of the rule which is to take care of it, "efTect"
might be stated: "No evidence can be considered . . ."
Professor J. B. Thayer and Dean \Vignore have sufficiently
demonstrated that the rule, if any, is not a rule of evidence, but
one of the substantive law, forbidding the fact sought to be
proved rather than any particular means of proof. The rule
4There will be no attempt made in this paper to cite cases in support
of the propositions discussed. What citation there is will be sporadic. Thv
nature of the instant discussion requires a running summary of %ariou
propositions, and the exigencies of space forbid any attempt at complete
citation.
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is admittedly not a rule of evidence. Yet many think of it in
terms of evidence. One wonders if the best way of stating it
would not be to use familiar terminology in such a manner as
to incorporate validly the nature of the rule as one of substantive law rather than one of the rules of evidence. Is it the
use of the word "evidence" or the manner of such use which
causes this rule to be confused with the true rules of evidence?
While this is the "parol evidence" rule, it seems best to express what is forbidden by it in terms of "all evidence" or the
converse "no evidence." To use "parol" requires further inquiry
into the meaning of the word to learn that it is used in the
sense of "extrinsic to the writing." "No evidence"" makes this
clear at the start. In the situations to which the rule applies, all
evidence besides the writing is forbidden. In the situations to
which it does not apply, all is permitted. "Parol" can be further
confused with "oral" 6 or "verbal." A word having the possible
sense of "oral" might achieve an unfortunate confusion as to
whether the rule applies only to oral testimony of extrinsic facts,
as distinguished from written testimony, or whether it applies
only to oral extrinsic facts. The true answer is that within
the scope of the rule it applies both to oral and written testimony
of oral and written facts.
In the Contracts Restatement 7 the forbidden items are stated
as "contemporaneous" and "prior" "agreements." "Agreements"
is of course peculiar to contract law. "Contemporaneous and
prior" validly expresses the idea that the rule does not go to
subsequent jural activity, but nevertheless leads to confusion.
"Contemporaneous" is a dangerous word. Few things are actually
contemporaneous. Those considered as theoretically contemporaneous are proved to be such only after considerable hairsplitting.
The present writer favors a treatment of the rule which disposes
of the effect and policy in as simple a manner as possible, leaving
the hairsplitting for the scope where it belongs and where it cannot be avoided.
Does the further phrasing "can be considered" carry out a
valid statement of the effect of the rule? It does if it makes it
clear that the rule is one of substantive law, going to the ultimate
5
Stephen's statement of the rule (see infra p. 47.) uses "no evidence"
as expressing what is debarred.
(;McKelvey, Evidence, 3d ed., sec. 302 refers to the rule as the "oral
evidence rule."
7
Sec. 233.

UNITY OF PAROL EIII)EA'CE RU'LE

fact and not the evidential means.. Certainly "no evidence can
be considered (for X purpose) . ." is the same as "no fact shall
be relevant (for X purpose) . .
A practical phase of the instant discussion is whether or not
objection must be made to facts forbidden by the rule at the time
they are offered in evidence. If the rule is a rule of evidence,
objection to forbidden facts must be made at their offering or
it will be too late. If it is a rule of relevancy, objection can be
reserved until the charge to the jury when the jurors can be instructed to give no operative effect to the forbidden fact. There
can be objection to an irrelevant fact at the time of offering if it
has no possible bearing on the case. But is it fair to require
objection at the peril of having the fact considered as operative ?
Some jurisdictions require one to object to facts forbidden by
the parol evidence rule when they are offered. Others more
logically treat it purely as a matter of substantive relevancy.
The latter treatment is theoretically valid. Evidence forbidden
because of irrelevancy or the parol evidence rule may be useful
for one purpose and not for another.
The rule does not debar the forbidden evidence entirely, but
merely denies to it consideration for a certain purpose, and usually
the only purpose. As there may be both a proper and improper
purpose for this forbidden testimony. it may have to go to the
jury safeguarded by instructions as to its proper use. Consequently, it seems unfair to require objection to be made to it
at the time of offering, or to require use for all purposes because
proper for one. Is a judge always ready to rule on the propriety
of admitting extrinsic testimony for certain purposes at the time
it is offered? Hearsay is hearsay and easily recognizable in any
event when offered. The judge can as readily determine at nine
o'clock as at noon whether a privileged communication is to be
admitted. Rules of evidence would be applied in the same way
in any case. But rules of relevancy vary from case to case and
may require for their application knowledge of facts vet to be
offered. To say "no evidence can be considered" seems to epitomize this phase of the rule and to prepare for the next problem,
as to what is the purpose for which all facts are debarred or
rendered irrelevant by the rule.
POLICY OF THE RULE

The law has by various methods recognized what may be
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called a human preference for the written act over the oral one."
It is the policy of the rule to preserve the security of written
transactions by making them superior to less formal acts. This
policy is usually expressed tangibly by the statement that the
parties are presumed to have merged all their preliminary negotiations into the writing, or that integration presupposes an intent
to render insignificant all that has gone before.
Many kinds of transactions can be validly accomplished without paper and pen. Parties are permitted to allow their acts to
be ascertained from a confused mass of oral mouthings if they
wish. But, when they do choose to adopt paper and pen, they
are thereby permitted to forget these oral acts and to look solely
to the crystallized act in order to discern the extent of their
transaction. When there are two oral acts covering the same
subject matter, they go to a fact-finder on an equal basis for his
or their determination as to the result. When one fact is written
and the other oral, the former goes to the law-finder and the latter
to the scrap-heap.
While one phase of the underlying policy of the rule is the
preference for the written over the oral act, it can also be justified by other reasons for its effect on one of the two classes of
facts a writing supersedes. The writing is said to supersede both
prior and contemporaneous parol facts. As to the supremacy of
the writing over prior facts, there is this second justification.
Other things being equal, a subsequent act replaces a prior inconsistent one. Thus later statutes may repeal earlier ones, later
wills may revoke earlier ones. By legal fiction a writing speaks
as the utterance of the involved parties as of the instant of
delivery. It thereby becomes a subsequent utterance which is
inconsistent with certain prior ones, and replaces them as would
any utterance of equal date. The writing's supremacy over
contemporaneous parol acts must depend on its being the more
important of two otherwise equal phenomena. It would seem
that the rule merely crystallizes the application of the general
principle mentioned above to a recurring situation by detailing
the tangible rule applicable where the subsequent activity is a
written utterance.
For our purposes the policy of the rule is to preserve intact
the crystallized acts to be found in the content of the writing and
8Hale, The Parol Evidence Rule, (1925) 4 Or. L. Rev. 91, 92.
rule breathes the spirit of the statutes of frauds and of wills."

"The
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the legal effect thereof. This is done by debarring evidence
offered for the purpose of varying such legal effect. Thus far,
the rule might be stated "No evidence can be considered for the
purpose of varying the legal effect of that which the law says
shall exclusively be the operative fact to determine a transaction."
To say "for the purpose of varying the legal effect" expresses
the idea that the rule does not apply to all evidence, or to all
evidence possibly at odds with the legal effect of a writing, but
only to such evidence as is offered for the purpose of being at
odds with this legal effect. What are some instances of this?
Evidence possibly "violative" of the rule may be admitted
under directory instructions as to its use to aid in interpretation.
Then, the extrinsic evidence may be needed as secondary evidence
to prove the contents of a lost document, itself the integration
which the rule protects. For the rule does not apply to transactions for which a writing has been offered in court, but to
transactionswhich were oiwc reduced to writing. This situation
is, however, rather theoreticalY A better example would seem
to be when one side claims the transaction to be integrated and
the other denies the integration but claims it is to be found from
other facts. Both sets of evidence may have to go to the jury
with instructions to disregard the extrinsic facts if the integration
is found to be established.
SCOPE OF THE RULE

Consideration is here appropriate as to the extent to which a
writing is an exclusive operative fact. The problem of the scope
is that of determining to what fact situations the rule does not
apply, that is, what facts satisfy the rule, or are permitted consideration despite it? IVhat "written transactions" are to be
secured by the rule? The two words "written" and "transaction" afford a suggestion of the analysis of the scope to be used
here. There must be a "transaction" which is "written."
By "transaction." which has a "legal effect" to be preserved,
is understood any "jural act,"10 including contracts, wills, statutes,
9
For if no vestige of writing exists, to use the preliminary negotiations as evidence thereof amounts ultimately to using them as operative
facts, even though it may be called the strict application of the parol
evidence rule.
105 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 2401 gives "jural act" as the
accurate term for this. The present writer prefers "transaction" as affording a more familiar and yet acceptable term. Wigmore's "jural act" is
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verdicts,"1 judgments. and deeds wherein changes in the legal
status quo may or must be accomplished by documentary means.
By "written" is understood the assent of the parties involved
to a crystallized form of words with the purpose that these words,
shall express the transaction as far as they go. "\Vritten" mnay
mean either that documents have been used as media of the
creation of the transaction, as where a deed is delivered, or offer
and acceptance are by letter; or where after an occurrence of
these a memorial of the transaction is subsequently drawn utp and
assented to. The problem of the scope, of determining what
elements of a "written transaction" are debarred by the rule.
might be attacked by detailing the theoretically most perfect
situation to which the rule could apply. Thus. if a writing is
the complete expression of a perfect, existing transaction, which is
the only one between the parties and the only one in issue iin the
instant case and nothing has happened subsequent to the integration thereof, the rule applies at its utmost. Such a case requires
only recourse to extrinsic facts to connect the parties in the
writing with the parties in the instant litigation. Such a situation is unlikely. No transaction can be absolutely free from the
necessity for some extrinsic evidence, and few approach the perfection detailed above.
As Dean Wigmore and Professor Corbin point out,"2 a writing
has in itself no intrinsic worth, and for it to have jural effect it
must be connected with the parties and things in litigation. Tlhe
question of the scope of the rule would be to detertmine what
effect the rule has on this necessary search for extrinsic facts.
Some extrinsic facts are necessary, others are forbidden by the
rule. The scope problem is to set the sheep aside from the goats.
Starting with the general premise that recourse to extrinsic
facts is always necessary despite the presence of an integration,
the parol evidence rule furnishes us an exception to this premise
in the form of a restriction on the use of certain extrinsic facts.
It seems that the scope of the rule cannot be so well analyzed in
criticized by Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract. (1919)

J. 739, 765, footnote 77.

28 Yale I..

120 Ark. 131. 178
"Arkansas State Fair Ass'n v. Hodges. (1915)
S. 'W. 936, reviewed in (1915) 29 Harv. L. Rev. 101 is an example of a
statute as a transaction subject to the parol evidence rule. As to jury
verdicts being subject to the rule, an extended discussion is to be found in
5 Wigmore, Evidence. 2d ed.. sec. 2345-56.
125 Wigmore, Evidence. 2(d ed., sec. 2400: Corbin. C(onditions in the I-l;w
of Contracts, (1919) 28 Yale L. J. 739, 764-68.
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terms of what is restricted as in terms of what is permitted
despite the rule. To group the fact situations permitted both by
the general premise and by the rule would seem to enable a
picking out of the boundaries and limits of the rule. The analysis
to be used here will be in terms of extrinsic facts permitted by
the rule. All other facts are debarred. The question will be how
to approach an analysis of the situations in which the rule permits
the consideration of extrinsic evidence.
The parol evidence rule is applied in a situation where both a
written operative fact and a fact extrinsic to it have been offered
for consideration. 13 The problem of the rule is to settle the conflict
between the writing and the fact. What effect does X writing
have on Y fact?
The rule proscribes extrinsic facts because they tend to contradict operative writings. 14 So the first step is to see whether
this writing is operative and whether there is present or absent
some element, the presence or absence of which makes it impossible
for this writing to have the operative effect claimed for it by
its proponent. The next step is to see whether this writing by its
content excludes the proffered fact. If the content of the writing
does not conflict with the purport of the proferred extrinsic fact,
the latter is capable of being considered as far as the rule is
concerned.
For the rule to apply, two elements must concur, namely, that
the writing is an operative fact and that it is operative to the same
end as the proffered fact. Evidence to show the writing not
operative, or to show facts not in conflict with it would not be
forbidden by the rule. If the writing is operative and complete,
it excludes everything. If not, an excursion beyond the scope of
the rule is necessary to discover the permitted details.
Dean Wigmore's analysis of the rule into the four components
of the jural act, Creation, Integration, Solemnization, and Interpretation is valuable for its recognition of the need of analyzing it
in terms of all the elements of a transaction rather than in terms
of those which could have been incorporated into the writing.
23The rule, of course, applies when action is brought on a prior promise,
possibly superseded by a writing. If so, the opponent need but offer the
written obligation, whereupon both it and the extrinsic fact will be in the
case and a normal parol evidence situation will be presented. See 2 Willissec. 631.
ton, Contracts,
-4An excellent example of the use of "operative" terminology in connection with the parol evidence rule is found in Corbin, Conditions in the
Law of Contract. (1919) 28 Yale L. J. 739, 764-68.

MINNESOT. 1L.AIiV REVIEII"

Certainly a better understanding of the rule about parol terms
which could have been incorporated into the writing is achieved
by comparison with similar terms which are not capable of integration. The arrangement to be used here is based largely on the
analysis of Dean Wigmore. The two main subdivisions are suggested by the two more important of his, Creation and Integration.
The other two are not considered by the present writer as important
enough to deserve separate space. Interpretation, as will be suggested, is but a phase of Integration. Solemnization, if it deserves
space at all, could be taken care of under Creation. Other lesser
departures in terminology and arrangement will be discussed later.
The analysis of the scope of the rule used here will comprehend
six groups or categories of fact situations, herein called 'limits"
under which will be listed the kinds of extrinsic facts which are
permitted despite the rule. The six limits will be grouped under
two general heads, each of which comprehends one of the general
problems involved in the application of the rule.
These two headings represent the twin problems of the existence of a transaction and the terms thereof. They represent
separable questions involved both in all transactions and in written
ones. Neither the factors bearing on existence nor those bearing on
terms can be completely expressed in writing. In actual practice
most of the factors bearing on existence are extrinsic while most
bearing on terms are contained in the writing if any. The distiliction between the two is as convenient for discussing the parol
evidence rule as for transactions in general.
The first one is the problem of the presence or absence of
some element which keeps the content of the writing from having the operative effect claimed for it. The question is whether
the writing has become and remained a valid transaction. l)oes
the transaction exist? What of its external sufficiency? The
next heading, "terms," will be called "expression" for purposes of the parol evidence rule. To what extent is the writing
an expression of the terms of the transaction? What of its
internal sufficiency?
OUTLINE

A. Existence (Extcrnal Natutre).-The rule permits the con-

sideration of a fact dehors the writing where it is offered to show
the presence or absence of some element, the presence or absence
of which negatives the existence of the jural situation claimed
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to be established by the writing. This evidence to show that
the content of the writing has not the operative effect claimed
for it may be considered to prove that:
1. No transaction was ever created, ("creation.")"
2. An imperfect transaction was created, ("imperfect.")
3. The transaction, once created, has since validly accomplished a certain change in form, ("termination.")
B. Expression (Internal Nature).-The rule permits the consideration of a fact actually not in conflict with the legal effect
of the content of a writing, where the proffered fact covers a
detail not provided for by the writing because:
4. The fact is rendered necessary by the content of the writing, in order to enforce the transaction. ("insufficient.")
5. The parties have never assented to the particular writing
as superseding the particular fact, because the fact is collateral
to the writing, ("collateral.")
6. The writing is not an operative fact in the transaction
being litigated in the instant case, ("independent.")
These six "limits" are not exceptions to the rule but rather
groups of facts which are permitted despite the rule. The use
of them satisfies the rule. The only real exception to the rule
will be discussed later. Before that there will be grouped under
the six headings the fact situations which have been adjudicated
and which belong there respectively.
II
EXISTENCE OF TRANSACTIONS

The parol evidence rule assigns an exclusive effect to operative
writings, causing the rejection of facts themselves possibly otherwise operative. 6 It applies only to operative writings, and then
only to the extent of their content. For a writing to be operative there must concur the existence or non-existence of certain
extrinsic facts the existence or non-existence of which is essential to give to the writing operative effect. There must exist a
34By "creation" and each of the other words found in parentheses after
the six categories is meant a short name. expressing the purport of that

zategory,
and by which it will be called in the ensuing discussion.
' 6Thus the Restatement of Contracts, Section 233, uses such terminology: "except as stated in sections 236 and 237, the integration of an agreement makes inoperative to add to or to vary the agreement all contemporaneous oral agreements relating to the same subject matter; and also. unless

the integration is void or avoidable and avoided, all prior oral or written
agreements relating thereto. If void or avoided, the integration leaves the
operation of prior agreements unaffected."
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transaction in which the writing is operative, namely, several
facts must concur to cause this transaction to exist at the time
action is brought in the instant case.
This problem of whether there exists a transaction in which the
writing is operative is looked at from three angles: (1) Is there
something present which prevents any transaction from ever having
arisen? (2) Was the transaction, if created, perfect and capable
of continued existence without destruction at the option of less
than all concerned? (3) Has anything happened since the creation
of the transaction to destroy the operative effect once caused by
this writing and the other then existing operative facts?
This form of attack may seem confusing, inasmuch as jurisdictions and opinions vary as to whether certain items make a
transaction void or voidable. This is one of the differences
between the "creation" category and the "imperfect" category.
But it is thought best to have the "imperfect" category placed
between complete non-creation and subsequent activity, in that
the factors allowed under it savor of both. The factors permitting
the avoidance of the transaction occur before the writing, while
the election to avoid occurs afterward. Voidability is at once
non-creation and termination and serves as an intermediate con17
cept between the two.
The placing of "termination" with "creation" is a departure
from Dean Wigmore's analysis as he considers "termination" a
phase of the completeness of expression or integration. The present writer thinks of the problem of expression as one of the
relative extent to which a writing records and supersedes what
has happened before and up to the time of its execution. That
question is one of determining whether the parties have intended
the particular writing to cover the proffered fact. They do not
and camot intend their writing to supersede what is to happen
later. It seems idle to include as a matter of their legal intent
something which they never could have actually intended. With
"expression" limited as it is here, the main problem therein is
one of analyzing the form of the words in the writing in the light
of surrounding circumstances to see whether it conflicts with the
proffered fact. The problem of existence is one of looking to see
whethen there are facts, the presence or absence of which keep
the writing from being an operative item and from causing the
17For this reason "creation" is here used in a more restricted sense than
it is by Dean Wigmore. He uses it to include what is here distributed IbCtween the "creation" and "imperfect" categories.
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legal result claimed for it in court. Then, to place "termination"
with "creation" enables the phrase "no evidence" to be used, which
avoids the confusion incident to "prior and contemporaneous."
1. Creation of Trasactions.-It does not violate the rule to
show some fact which negatives entirely the existence of the transaction in which the writing might have been operative. These
facts fall into four groups:
A. Facts which show that the transaction by its nature was not
intended by the parties to cause a legal result. Tius it may be
shown that the transaction is in reality one of charity, friendship,
or jest. Sham transactions logically belong in the same category
although some jurisdictions punish the perpetrators thereof by
enforcing the contract.", This seems unnecessary. I f the sham
transaction between A and B is intended to deceive X, it would
seem to suffice to let X set up the fraud on him as a defense to
whatever liability he assumed in reliance on the sham. The state
can punish A and B criminally, if necessary. There seems no need
to punish one of the parties by allowing the other to enforce the
writing against him. 19 Then, evidence to show that a writing is
actually evidential and not operative is admissible. Such a case
would be to show that a writing, apparently a release, is actually a
receipt. If a signature to a paper was appended solely to witness
an obligor's signature, the true situation may be shown even though
the signature in question is apparently that of an obligor.
B. Facts tending to show that the writing, or some other
essential fact, is not the act of the party whose act must have
occurred to give the transaction the desired effect. Thus it may
be shown that the document is a forgery, that it has been materially altered, or that a verdict was rendered without the necessary
assent of the entire jury. It may be shown that the paper was
delivered on an unperformed condition precedent which does not
It may be shown
clash with any express term of the writing.'
185 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 2406, suggests that the reprehensible
sham transactions should be enforced as a punishment.
'9Coffman v. Malone, (1916) 98 Neb. 819. 154 N. NV. 726, I.. R. A.
1917B 258, favorably reviewed in (1916) 16 Col. L Rev. 159. \%as a caw,
refusing to enforce a written sham contract.
2oPym v. Campbell, (1856) 6 El. & BI. 370 is the classical case on this
point. The matter of parol proof of an escrow is treated in the followitg
articles: Ballantine, Delivery in Escrow and the Parol Evidence Rule, (1920)
29 Yale L. J. 826; Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract. (1919) 28
Yale L. J. 739, 764-68; Hale, The Parol Evidence Rule, (1925) 4 Or. L.
Rev. 91, 111-19. The first named article, Ballantine, (1920) 28 Yale L. J.
834 et seq., treats the parol proof of an escrow as an exception to the parol
evidence rule. This is based on consideration of the delivery of the writing
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that an agent purporting to have authority had no such, or that
the writing purporting to be final and adopted was merely a memorandum or preliminary negotiation and never assented to by the
parties in question either as an act or as an integration thereof.
C. Facts tending to show the incapacity of one of the actors
in a transaction to assume the liability apparently imposed. To
the extent to which personal incapacity is considered as making
a transaction void, mention of it is appropriate here as well as
in the "imperfect" category.
D. Facts offered to show surrounding circumstances which
prevent the writing from having the normal jural effect possibly
discoverable from its content. Thus, destruction of the subject
matter of a sale, or mistake, or that the contract was made on
Sunday, or was usurious or illegal, or had no consideration, or
that there was a failure of consideration, or impossibility, or
uncertainty, or that a judgment was rendered against a person
over whom there was no jurisdiction may be shown.
These four parts of the first category deal with extrinsic
facts offered to show that a writing has not the operative effect
it appears to have or can be shown to have. Facts to show that
a writing does have operative effect are dealt with in the fourth
category, that of insufficiency of expression. It may be said for
the first category, that the scope of the rule includes only writings
which are a part of a legal transaction that has achieved valid
existence, and that the rule does not forbid the evidencing of
non-contradictory facts to disprove this existence.
2. Imperfect Transactions.-The word "imperfect" is used
as a generic term to cover three groups of situations, in all of
which a transaction has been created but where, by virtue of some
extrinsic facts, its existence is so imperfect as to permit one party
or less than all to throw off all or part of the liability imposed
or have it judicially altered. The following arrangement is suggested by the Contracts Restatement:21
(a) Facts to show that the transaction is voidable and has been
avoided for any reason which the law permits, such as infancy,
fraud, duress, illegality, alteration, and insanity. (b)
Facts to
show that a party is entitled to a judicial declaration for substituted
under such circumstances as creating a legal transaction. Were the initial
premise unassailable the conclusion would stand. There seems to he
reasonable argument contra, that the rule of Pym v. Campbell does not
present
21 an exception to the parol evidence rule.
Sec. 234, parts B, C. D.
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or removed liability by reformation or rescission because of
mistake. (c) Facts to defeat a suit for specific performance because of mistake, unfairness, or oppression.
All of these factors are available, whether they go to the original
creation of the transaction or to the later adoption of the writing
as an integration, should the two be separate. Such result will
follow within the limits of the rules of the substantive law herein
involved. The statement sometimes found that the parol evidence
rule does not apply in equity is inaccurate. What is meant is that
in certain actions, solely equitable, certain extrinsic facts to show
a transaction imperfect will be considered to achieve the ends of
equity. The name "imperfect" seems aptly to summarize both
voidability and capacity for judicial reformation, rescission, or
denial of 'specific performance. This expresses the idea that a
transaction exists though it is less of a transaction than a perfect
one.
It might be said, to summarize this category, that the rule
applies only to the extent to which the transaction is free from
destruction or alteration by reason of its imperfections.
3. Termination of Transactions.-The rule permits the consideration of facts occurring subsequent to the writing in question.
which tend to show that the transaction has ceased to effectuate
the jural result it once did. Termination of the legal effect may
be shown by facts evidencing: (a) Performance, or termination
in a manner provided by the transaction as created; (b) subsequent
happenings, independent of the will of the parties, which destroy
the jural effect of the transaction, such as Act of God, bankruptcy,
impossibility, supervening incapacity, and similar defenses; and
(c) subsequent substituted act of the parties such as rescission,
alteration, novation, waiver, or reintegration, or any of the recognized subsequent jural acts of the parties which stand by themselves and which replace prior inconsistent acts. One writer has
3uggested 2 2 that there should be a statutory extension of the statute
3f frauds to require subsequent alteration of written contracts to
be in writing. This seems an unnecessary relict of the older rule
that a deed could not be varied by parol and entirely out of
harmony with the lesser need for a statute of frauds in our present
day legal system.
To summarize this category, the transaction must continue to
cause the legal result it originally did, and if something subsequent
22Nordlinger, Oral Modification of a Written Contract, (1926) 26
Col. L. Rev. 432.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

to the writing has terminated its effect to any extent, evidence of
such facts may be considered. The rule applies only to the extent
to which the writing creates or represents the creation of a transaction which has remained in existence at the time it is sued on.
For the first three categories, and the first general heading
it might be said that the scope of the rule is: "A written transaction which has achieved and continued valid existence."
III
THE EXPRESSION OF THE TERMS OF TRANSACTIONS

If the first parol evidence problem is solved, and the writing has
escaped having its operative effect destroyed by the extrinsic facts
entitled to consideration under one of the first three categories, the
next problem is as to the extent to which the writing provides
for and thereby supersedes details which have occurred before
and up to the time of its execution. From the hypothesis that
a writing alone means nothing, we have a general premise that
some extrinsic facts are always necessary which are in any case
the proof that the writing is the act of the parties and the proof
of the identity of the beneficiaries of the transaction. These can
never be sufficiently encompassed in the written expression of
the transaction. Proof of these the rule always permits.
Thus the rule cannot be said to apply to "written transactions,"
because there can be no such thing as a completely written transaction. At most, the rule applies to the "written part of a transaction." The question of expression would then seem to be
one of the extent to which a transaction is written, i. e., expressed
in writing by a crystallized form of words to which the parties
have assented for the purpose of superseding previous dealings on
the same subject matter.
Before going into a discussion of when a proffered fact will
be debarred by a writing, there might also be a discussion of what
writings constitute the "written part of a transaction" which is
protected by the rule. The following statements have been
offered: "When a jural act is embodied in a single memorial, all
other utterances of the parties on that topic are legally immaterial . . .", "The parol evidence rule assumes agreement upon

the writing in question as a complete statement of the bargain.""'
Could not a beginner deduce from such statements that the parol
Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 2425.
242 Williston, Contracts, sec. 636.
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evidence rule could protect at most but one piece of paper involved
in a transaction and then only if it happened to be absolutely
complete and perfect? The present writer feels that the writings
protected by the rule are "the one or more writings or parts of
writings which the parties have expressedly or impliedly assented
to as accurately expressing the particular terms included within
the content of their words." This is the "written part of the
transaction." Are not the above statements dealing with the ideal
situation rather than with normal daily transactions?
The question is as. to what facts may be considered, and what
may not, because they conflict with the "written part of a transaction." As far as the parol evidence rule is concerned, any fact
may be considered so long as it does not vary the legal effect of
the "written part of a transaction." These facts, entitled to consideration because not at variance with the legal effect of the
"written part of a transaction" can be grouped under headings
which readily shade off into each other and which will be here
classified in three groups under convenient titles. These facts
include interpretative facts and parts of the transaction not
covered by the writing, collateral transactions based on the same
consideration and on different considerations, transactions between
parties other than the one!. in litigation, and facts to contradict
non-transactional writings.
The present writer would place the problem of interpretation
as a phase of the question of relative sufficiency of expression
for two reasons: (1) There seems to be very little difference
between recourse to interpretative facts to give effect to a form
of words and recourse to other facts to fill in the gaps in a transaction because the written form of words incompletely expresses
the transaction. Is not either a matter of supplying from less
reliable sources what the parties failed to include in the crystallized
form of words to which they assented? (2) That in order to
solve the problem of whether a given writing debars a proffered
fact because the term sought to be established is provided for
by the writing, there must be a judicial declaration of the meaning
of the content of the writing before there can be any application of
the parol evidence rule one way or another. Is not Professor
Williston's statement" that the parol evidence rule fixes the subject
matter of interpretation inappropriate? Does it not convey the
idea that the application of the parol evidence rule is finished
252 Williston, Contracts, sec. 631.
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before there need be any recourse to the interpretation rules f
It seems that there cannot be any application of the parol evidence
rule without an interpretation of the form of words in the writing
to see whether the proffered fact is provided for therein. To
determine what varies the legal effect of the "written part"
requires a determination of whether both writing and fact call
have legal effect to the same end. Is not this an ad hoc interpretation ?
One cannot speak of the legal effect of an operative writing,
as a writing by itself can have no legal effect. But a writing can
furnish part of the legal effect of a transaction. Thus one can
speak of the legal effect of the written part of a transaction. What
is the legal effect of the written part of a transaction, or what
part of the legal effect of a transaction is furnished by the written
part of it? The legal effect of the written part of the transaction
comprehends: (1) A positive effect-enforceability to all the
"terms" expressed by the writing, or to be implied in fact or in
law therefrom. (2) A negative effect-the exclusion and nonexistence of any other unnecessary terms which would be included
in such a document by normal men acting under the same circumstances. Any fact offered for the purpose of varying a term
in class 1, or of adding a term in class 2 would vary the
legal effect of the written part of the transaction.
What is a "term" of a transaction? A "term" of a transaction
is a minute detail of the result caused by the coincidence of
operative facts. "Terms" has come to mean the several groups
of words tangibly describing the several minute details of the
jural situation resulting from the creation of the transaction.
For purposes of the parol evidence rule, terms are divided into
those found' in the writing and those not. Those found in the
writing include (a) Expressed terms which are those sonic part
of which is laid down by words used by the parties. (b) terms
implied in fact by the words used, and (c) terms implied in law
by the words used. Those terms not found in the writing are
(a) those necessary to an enforceable transaction and (b) thoe
not intended to be covered by the writing.
4. Insufficiency of Expressio.-The rule forbids facts offered
to vary the legal effect of certain writings. Facts which are permissible under this category and which furnish some detail
essential to the enforceability of the written transaction carry
forward the legal effect of the writing rather than vary it and
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so are by hypothesis not affected by the rule. The parol evidence
rule, unlike the statute of frauds, does not purport to lessen the
number of enforceable transactions. Rather it attempts to see
that the better grade of transaction is enforced as against the
lesser. So "bolstering" evidence is favored where necessary. The
purport of this category is expressed by the same words as for
the policy, that the rule applies only to evidence which varies the
legal effect.
The facts permitted under this category are those without which
the written transaction cannot be enforced. They will be subdivided as follows:
A. Facts to establish definite necessary terms of the transaction.
When a written expression of an ordinary contract shows no
consideration, the true consideration may be shown, even though
it carries along an oral promise.28 When the writing is an acceptance, the offer must be shown, and vice versa. The privilege oi
evidencing consideration'for a written promise that shows none
is satisfactory enough where a consideration is an essential operative fact. But suppose the writing is sealed and in a jurisdiction
which preserves the common law lack of necessity for consideration in such event? Or suppose it is governed by the law of a
jurisdiction which has the Uniform Written Transaction Act or a
similar statute dispensing with consideration for written promises
in certain cases? Then recourse to the erstwhile necessary element
can no longer be justified by necessity. The search is for nece.sary extrinsic facts and consideration seems unnecessary. The
answer would probably be that the writing integrates and supersedes but one side of the transaction and that the counter-promises
are "collateral" and may be shown.
This is akin to the question that would arise when the writing
shows one consideration, but the parties wish to prove another.
Here a distinction is made between a recital of the performance
of consideration, usually the payment of ioney, and a written
term of a consideration to be. The former may be contradicted.
being merely an evidential recital and not an operative term, but
the latter may not be. Thus it is seen that the rule applies only
to the operative parts of writings and not to their evidential parts.
A term of a transaction is not "necessary" simply because it is
not expressed in the writing. If it is to be implied from the content of the writing, it may not be varied any more than if it iq
26

Contracts Restatement see. 236 (2).
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completely expressed. The conventional example of this iithe
case of a promise to pay money with no time specified in the
writing but with a parol agreement on a specific date. The rule
keeps this parol agreement from being valid, because there is an
implied term of payment at a reasonable time which cannot be
varied by the extrinsic fact.
As to terms conclusively implied in law, such as the contract
resulting from a blank indorsement of a negotiable instrument, the
result is simple. When the legal implication is a conclusive one,
none can deny the justice of the result which forbids the varying
of the term. , But suppose the legal implication is set up by a
rebuttable presumption? Can facts extrinsic to the writing be
used to rebut the presumption? The Uniform Sales Act has
many "rules for ascertaining the intention of the parties" ' 27 as to
the time at which title passes in a sale of goods. They provide
that a certain result shall follow from certain facts "unless a
contrary intention appears." The most typical example is that
which provides that an agreement upon specified goods shall
pass title immediately. Suppose the writing merely contains the
essential elements to raise this presumption, can extrinsic facts be
used to show that the parties intended title to pass later?
A different provision of the Sales Act2 8 would seem to permit
recourse to the "conduct of the parties . . . and the circumstances

of the case" to ascertain the intention of the parties. Then, is
there any difference between a term implied in law and one
implied in fact? Is not either a judicial addition to the language of
the parties based on their actual words? The difference would
seem to be that a fact implication permits a fact-finder to draw
a certain inference while a legal implication requires such inference
to be drawn.
B. Facts expressly called for by the content of the writing.
If the writing itself demands explicitly that other facts be
secured, the evidencing of these facts is permitted by the rule.
Thus, the well known doctrine about incorporation of other documents into a will permits the use of these documents despite the
rule. A letter accepting "your offer" permits recourse to the letter
or spoken word containing the offer. It does not seem satisfactory
to call them parts of the same integration any more than to refer
to contemporaneous writings in such a manner as (toes the Con"TUniform Sales Act, sec. 19.
-5Uniform Sales Act, sec. 18 (2).
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tracts Restatement.2 9 To state that the rule permits recoure I,
facts called for by the operative writing seems to take care of the
situation when we remember also that the true effect of the
"contemporaneous" execution of different writings is to disprove
any intent that one shall supersede the matter contained in the other.
Another example would be the filling in of a blank in a writing.
When this is permitted, it is but recourse to extrinsic facts explicitly called for. This is clearly so in the case of a writing which
is but the memorial of a transaction otherwise created. When the
writing is a medium of creation, the case may run afoul oi
some other rule, declaring the transaction void for uncertainty
because of the blank.
C. Facts impliedly called for by the content of the writing.
Herein are the facts usually found necessary for purposes of
"interpretation." To make a transaction enforceable, the word,
of the parties have to be translated into the language of the
tribunal and into details sufficiently minute for the court and jury
to grasp and use. These facts are impliedly called for by the
content of the writing, because there exists a need for such facts
when the content of the writing is unable by its own force to
achieve the necessary end which such facts will serve. Custom.
usage, standards of interpretation, sources of interpretation, all
furnish the facts permitted here despite the rule.
The concept of the "incomplete" writing has given rise to
no little quibbling. The dispute seems to be between permitting
recourse only to the face of the writing to discover incompleteness
and permitting recourse to facts dehors the writing for that
purpose. 30 To avoid such confusion, the present article hopes
to avoid the word "incomplete." There seem to be two components of that concept, recognizing in their spheres the two extremes.
The one of the "face-of-the writing" test seems to be taken care
of by the "insufficient" category, permitting recourse to such facts
as are called for by the writing. The "incompleteness" which must
be shown, if at all, dehors the writing seems to fit in with the
"collateral" category and to depend on being a matter not intended
to be covered by the writing.
5. Collateral Facts.-Into this category are deposited all of
the most formidable problems to be found under the parol
-9 Comment to section 233.
:OAn article by Dean Hale, The Parol Evidence Rule, (1925) 4 Or. L
Rev. 91, 96-107, treats of the wavering of the Oregon court on this point.
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evidence rule. For it is here that the legal bugaboo known as
the intent of the parties is met with. Any legal concept which
purports to hinge on the so-called intent of human beings is
doomed to confusion. This phase of the parol evidence rule
is no exception.
The functioning of the rule hinges on the actual or presumed
intent of the parties to assent to a crystallized group of words as
expressing their transaction. At best this intention has some
limits and cannot be extended to make the writing supersede all
things. Facts which the parties did not intend to be superseded
by the writing are collateral to it. There are present here the
two problems, (1) was the writing assented to, and (2) what is its
legal effect, positive and negative?
To the extent to which the writing goes it would not seem
hard to show assent thereto as this crystallized expression. The
signing and delivery of a document by a party should show his
satisfaction with it. That the writing, or some part of it, is
necessary to the enforceability of a transaction under which the
party claims should do as well. That the document was a forna!
one is helpful. The more formal a document, the easier to show
assent, though the less would be its debarring legal effect. The
less formal the document, tie harder to show assent, but the more
it debars after it is assented to. Thus a private letter may not have
been intended as an integration, but if so, its content can more
easily be held to exclude a collateral term than a formal adoption
contract, presumed to have been intended as an integration and
yet restricted in scope by its nature.
The writing having been assented to, the next matter is, how
far has it been assented to? That is, what is the legal effect of
the writing in the light of the "necessary" extrinsic facts? 'lie
positive legal effect, enforceability to the expressed, implied in
law, or implied in fact terms is the easier angle to attack. It
merely requires a determination of whether the writing and the
proffered fact have legal effect to the same end, or bear on the
same term. Dean Wigmore suggests as a test that if tile particular
element covered by the proffered fact is mentioned at all in the
document, the latter supersedes it. What about the addition of
terms not mentioned at all in the document and not necessary to
its enforceability?
In this connection it might be wise to eliminate first the easier
problem. Where the extrinsic fact is a parol promise based on a
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different consideration than the one supporting written promnise by
the same promisor, the rule does not forbid the fact. Not only
can it be said that this negatives any intent to exclude the fact,
but it approaches an "independent" transaction, covered by the
sixth category. In addition it meets the test applied to pronises
based on the same consideration.
It is as to these promises based upon the same consideration ab
the written one that we have the lowest depths of confusion incident
to the rule. All other matters fade into insignificance when conipared to it. The answer is not satisfactory, but none such seems
possible. The Contracts Restatement"1 expresses best the test when
it declares that to be collateral and hence not superseded which
"... is such an agreement as might naturally be made as a separate
agreement by parties situated as were the parties to the writter
contract." Such an objective test is of little value for certainty,
but is as reasonable as can be. It again reminds us of the futility
of requiring objection to the extrinsic fact at the time of its being
offered in evidence. To apply this test requires a temporary consideration of the proffered fact and many other facts possibly
not then in the case.
What of a writing which itself stipulates that it is the whole
contract between the parties? Such effort might show assent to the
writing, although one doubts whether it can receive a strict application in every case. It can never accomplish proof of those
things always resting in parol. It could hardly negative contracts
based on a different consideration. Might there not still be some
terms which would be expressed in parol despite such a stipulation? The use of such a phrase is but a stronger case for the
relative completeness of expression.
When writings are executed contemporaneously or refer to
each other by incorporation, this is evidence to rebut the presumption that either was intended to contain all and goes to show
a non-intent that either should supersede the subject matter of
the other.
To summarize this category, there could be used a phrase that
might also apply to the fourth, that the rule apl)lies only to the
written part of a transaction. What is the written part is always
a disputable question.
6. Independent Transactions.-Hereinwill be treated the contradiction of writings which were never assented to by the exact
31
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same parties to the instant litigation and which never were part
of any of their immediate transactions. If the writing is not ati
operative fact in any transaction between any persons, the rule
does not apply at all. Writings, at most, which are but evidential
may be contradicted. Thus receipts and other admissions may be
contradicted. The rule applies only to operative writings, those
which furnish the "legal effect of . . . a transaction."
A harder case is one in which a writing is operative between
the parties to it, but one in which they are not the identical parties
to the instant case, in which the writing is offered. X and Y have
a written transaction. A and B are in litigation. The XY writing
is offered in the AB case, and the question arises whether A or B
shall be permitted to offer facts for purposes forbidden X and Y
by the parol evidence rule. Courts and writers are not agreed as
to the application of the rule to strangers to the document.
A theoretical answer is that when the transaction between X
and Y is offered in the AB case, the rule applies and neither
A nor B can vary the writing any more than can X and Y. The
practical answer of many courts is that the rule does not apply
except in controversies between the parties to the writing. Some
courts add a very cogent rider, "unless claiming under the writing." This last phrase gets closer to making practical decisions
square with the correct theory of the rule although it is not
wholly accurate.
The rule applies only to operative writings-writings operative
in the instant case. If A and B "claim under" the XY writing, it
is because the XY writing is operative in theA B case, and is an
operative fact by adoption. If it is not "claimed under," it is not
operative in the AB case. Then A or B may contradict it because
it is at most evidential.
An example of a writing operative as to some parties and evidential as to others would be a judgment recovered by a creditor
against the principal debtor when offered in a suit against the
surety. As between creditor and principal, the judgment finally
determines the amount due. When offered against the surety.
he may contradict the judgment and show a different amount due.
It is operative in the first instance and evidential in the latter.
An example of a writing operative as to parties not expressly
assenting is a binding written extension of time by creditor to
principal. The case arises when the writing is in form an extension
of time, with a parol term omitted that would make it a covenant
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not to sue, and hence no defense to the surety. The parol stipulation which would turn the extension of time into a covenant
not to sue cannot be shown in a suit against either the principal
or the surety. In such instance the surety's defense hinges on
what is the enforceable contract between principal and creditor.
The writing is all of it.
Then there is the much mooted borderline situation of the
written release executed to one tort-feasor with an accompanying
parol stipulation which would turn it into a covenant not to sue,
consequently reserving the right to sue the other tort-feasor. A is
injured by the joint tort of B and X. He negotiates with B, orally
agrees on a covenant not to sue B, and signs a writing, in form,

an absolute release. A sues X, X sets up the release, and A
wishes to bring in the parol stipulation to prove it nothing more
than a covenant not to sue. A recent line of cases permits this,
mainly basing their result on the well known phrase that the rule
does not apply to strangers to the document unless claiming
under it.
Mainly from these cases, Professor Harris in a recent article
finds and approves of a definite exception to the "scientific theory"
of the parol evidence rule. 3- Dean Wigmore tacitly admits that
such cases do violence to the theory of the rule although he disapproves the result.33
Professor Williston criticises the cases
on theory by comparison to the situation where a creditor extends
time to the principal.34
It is the present writer's opinion that these joint tort-feasor
cases are perfectly consistent with the theory of the parol evidence
rule and do not form an exception thereto. To follow Professor
Harris's example it might be well to compare the scientific statements of the writers with the practical dictum of the courts. Professor Williston says, "Where the issue in dispute, even between
third parties, is what are the obligations of A and B to one another,
and those obligations are stated in a written contract, the parol
evidence rule is applicable." 3 Dean WVigmore says, ". . . the rule
will still apply to exclude extrinsic utterances, even as against
32
Harris, Does the Parol Evidence Rule Apply When One of the
Parties to the Controversy is a Stranger to the Contract, (1927) 22 I11.L.
Rev.3274.
3In approving a case which held the parol evidence rule applicable in
such situation. Natrona Power Co. v. Clark, (1924) 31 \Vyo. 284, 225 Pac.
586, noted in (1924) 19 Ill. L Rev. 205.
342 Williston, Contracts, sec. 647.
352 Williston, Contracts, sec. 647.
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other parties, provided it is sought to use thoe utterances fr
the very purpose for which the writing has superseded them as a
'
Corpus Juris says, "The rule . . . applies only in
legal act." 36
controversies between the parties to the instrument and thoe
claiming under them...
In the light of this let us compare the joint tort-feasor situation with the extension of time to the principal. \When a creditor
extends time to the principal, why does that discharge the surety?
Because the whole obligation on which the surety is liable hal
been totally destroyed by the transaction between creditor and
principal, embodied in the writing. The surety is using the writing
for the very purpose for which the parties to it used it an(d so
the utterances are rendered nugatory by the writing. The issue
in dispute is "what are the obligations of I' and C." for on
them hinges S's obligation.
But when one tort-feasor is permitted to set up a release to
\%hen A
another, a different underlying reason is present.
releases B and sues X, A may contradict the release, because it
is not then an operative fact, but merely an evidential one of
the real operative fact which is compensation of the injured party.
The reason for allowing one tort-feasor to set up a release to
another is because the injured person has been paid and is
entitled only to one payment and no more. The operative fact is
the one of payment, and as between A and X, the release is merely
a receipt, an evidential admission subject to all contradiction.As between A and B the release is both a receipt for paynlent
and an enforceable promise to stay out of court. As to X it is but
a receipt and may be contradicted by any evidence to show it is
a qualified receipt for less than the complete satisfaction which
can avail X. These hairsplitting technicalities result not from the
nature of the parol evidence but from the rules of torts and suretyship which permit a fine line to be drawn between covenants not to
sue on one side and extensions or releases on the other. In the AX
case the issue is not what are the obligations of A and B to each
other, but whether A has been paid anything. In that case the
parties are not using the utterances for the same purpose they
would in a suit by A vs. B.
365 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 2446.

3722
C. J. 1292.
3
8The writers on torts seem to agree that the true reason for holding
that a release to one tort-feasor releases another is the satisfaction of the
injured party rather than the destruction of the obligation sued on, 7 Jaggard, Torts, sec. 117: Cooley. Torts, 2d ed., 160.
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To make the line of criticism complete, it might be well to
repeat Professor Harris's point that the result reached in the tortfeasor cases does not make sense with the language used by the
courts2 9 They say "the rule applies in controversies between
parties to the document and those claiming under it." \Vhen .\ isuing X and X sets up A's release to B, is it not a controver-sv
between a party to the document and one claiming under it
Does not X claim under the document executed to B? It would
seem so. If this be true, the rule should be applied in such a case
to exclude the extrinsic fact which would turn a release into a
covenant not to sue.
It would seem that there is a valid distinction between the
tort-feasor cases and the suretyship cases, and that they are
actually consistent with the scientific theory of the rule, and not
an exception to it. Then it would seem that the courts reach a
correct result but do not follow out the erroneous statement of
principle which they themselves lay down.
What statement of principle will cover this? \hen the written part of a transaction is an operative fact in the instant litigation, it cannot be varied by the parties litigating any more than by
the" original parties to the transaction. For this category the
scope of the rule might be said to be "a transaction in issue in the
instant case," using "in issue" as meaning "an operative fact."
In the suretyship case, the transaction between principal and
creditor is in issue, while in the tort-feasor case it is the fact of
payment to the injured party that is in issue, evidenced by the
transaction between him and the other tort-feasor. It is the policy
of the rule to protect only the transactions being litigated.
IV
It is submitted that these six categories with one exception
cover the entire territory of extrinsic facts that are admitted in
a case where a writing is offered as an operative fact. They are
groups of facts which the rule by its nature does not forbid. The
analysis of these facts will be used as the basis for the unitary
statement of the rule to follow.
Will not the following eclectic combination of statements
39Harris, Does the Parol Evidence Rule Apply When One of the
Parties to the Controversy is a Stranger to the Contract, (1927) 22 Ill.
L. Rev. 274, 283.
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announced in previous times suffice for a unitary statement of the
parol evidence rule:
"No evidence can be considered for the purpose of varying
the legal effect of the written part of a transaction in issue which
has achieved and continued valid existence."
Before going into a discussion of the validity of this phrasing,
it might be well to see whether there exist any genuine exceptions
to the rule as here stated, that is, are there any further kinds of
facts which are permitted by courts that cannot be crammed into
one of the six categories used ab6ve.
It seems to the present writer that there exists but one well
recognized exception to the parol evidence rule. That is the one
which permits the proof of extrinsic facts to show that the parties
to a transaction hold to each other a different relation from the one
resulting from the form of the written transaction. Thus, it is
held in many jurisdictions that an absolute deed may be shown
to be a mortgage or deed of trust, that an apparent principal or
joint maker may be shown to be a surety and that one signing
apparently in his sole capacity was actually signing as an agent.4
These situations are similar, because in each the general transaction remains entire; but the parties are shown to bear to each
other a different relation, with all the varying legal incidents that
may result from this changed relation. While various courts and
writers attempt to justify this for reasons which satisfy the rule,
yet the damning word "except" creeps into their language. The
present writer considers it an exception and nothing less though
a justifiable exception probably based on a recognition of the
inequality existing between the money lender and his victim. This
seems to be the only true exception to the rule as it can be stated.
The writer is unable to agree with Professor Ballantine's theory
that the escrow principle is one and Professor Harris's that the
non-application of the rule to third parties is another.
There would seem to be two objections to the validity of the
phrasing of the parol evidence rule as used here: (1) that the
generalization used here is not a workable one, and (2) that the
generalization used here cannot be denoted a "rule" because it
hinges on other "rules" and legal precepts for its application; or, to
put it tersely, that the phraseology used here expresses neither
a unit nor a rule. They will be discussed in that order.
405

Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed., secs. 2437-38.
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Dean Wigmore has suggested that there is no possible generalization of practical consequence for the parol evidence rule. 16
the one used here of practical consequence? It is neither new nor
radical. It is based largely on the two classical statements of the
rule laid down in the past, those of Greenleaf and Stephen.
Greenleaf says:"
"Parol contemporaneous evidence is inadmissible to contradict
or vary the terms of a valid written instrument."
Stephen states in more detail

:42

"When any judgment of any court or any other judicial or
other official proceeding, or any contract or grant, or any other
disposition of property has been reduced to the form of a document or series of documents, no evidence may be given of such
judgment or proceeding, or of the terms of such contract, grant
or other disposition of property except the document itself, or
secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary
evidence is admissible under the provisions hereinbefore contained.
Nor may the contents of such document be contradicted, altered,
added to or varied by oral evidence."' 3
The phrasing suggested above includes most of the better
elements of these two, with some alterations to meet the demands
of the scientific theory of the rule, and the addition of a word
or two to make the treatment complete. Of this phraseology
Stephen furnishes "no evidence," while "can be considered for
the purpose of varying" is a more "scientific"" treatment of
Greenleaf's "inadmissible to contradict or vary," because it eliminates the damning word "inadmissible" which is reserved by the
writers for the true rules of evidence. Thus far the effect of the
rule is incorporated into the statement.
"Varying the legal effect" takes care of the policy of the rule
and is a substitute for Greenleaf's "vary the terms." "Written
part of a transaction in issue" expresses the second general division of the scope of the rule and more accurately expresses what
Greenleaf covers with "written instrument" and Stephen by
411 Greenleaf, Evidence, 16th ed., sec. 275.
423Stephen, Digest of Evidence, Art. 90.
' Ballantine, Delivery in Escrow and the Parol Evidence Rule, (1920)
29 Yale L J. 826, 835, gives the following statement of the rule: "The
parol evidence rule that oral testimony will not be admitted to vary or to
contradict the purport of a legal instrument which has once been delivered
and made operative."
4""Scientific" is here used in the sense of conforming to the "scientific"
theory of the rule which recognizes it as one of the substantive law rather
than one of evidence.
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"reduced to a document." It is not "documents" or "instruments"
that are protected, but the documentary part of transactions.
"Which has achieved and continued valid existence" at once
takes care of the first three categories of the scope and expands
on Greenleaf's "valid," while contracting Stephen's rather lengthy
description of the various transactions subject to the rule.
The statement used here expresses a definite result and at the
same time incorporates all the phases of the analysis of the rule
used. It starts with the assumption that no evidence can be considered when an operative writing has been offered and then
delimits the kinds of facts which are permitted by the rule. All
others are debarred.
The other objection is that a valid "rule" cannot hinge on another rule. Dean Pound defines a rule as that which "prescribes
a fixed and definite result for a fixed and definite situation of
fact." 4 5 If this means that no rule can depend on another rule,
there are very few rules in existence. Thus, if it be a rule that
,a wife may not testify against her husband," we must assume
the marital relation or lack of it as a "fact" in order to apply the
rule, although such "fact" actually depends on legal precepts for
its determination. If it be a rule that "when A kills B with malice
aforethought, he is guilty of murder," we must assume the malice
or lack thereof as a fact to apply the rule, although they depend on
legal precepts also. The present rule involves reference to several
subsidiary rules for its application but differs only as a matter
of degree from others requiring less recourse. Can it not be said
that the parol evidence rule is a single central one depending for
its application on other rules which supply the six kinds of facts
permitted by the rule? If the statement of it used here does not
express a "rule"-broad though it be, it states a most narrow
principle.
To summarize: The parol evidence rule epitomizes a well recognized body of doctrine. Its effect is to debar certain evidence
from consideration. Its policy is to protect the preferred type of
legal transaction. It debars the evidence which would destroy the
preferred transaction. The scope of the rule, expressed in six
"limits" or categories, is "the written part of a transaction in issue
which has achieved and continued valid existence." The rule
permits evidence to show that the writing never had legal effect.
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or that it had an imperfect legal effect, or that its legal effect has
been validly terminated. Facts may be considered when they are
necessary to the transaction, or not intended to be covered by the
writing, or entirely independent of it. There is but one well
recognized exception, that which permits a different relation of
the parties to each other to be shown. All other permitted facts
are usable because they are beyond the scope of the rule and not in
violation of it.
To say "no evidence can be considered for the purpose of varying the legal effect of the written part of a transaction in issue
which has achieved and continued valid existence" seems to express
all this. Despite the fact that it requires recourse to other rules
for its application, this rule stands above them as a separate one
depending on them for its support. E pluribus unum.

